The Banyamulenge of Eastern Congo: A Humanitarian Crisis, the Protection of Civilians, and the Quest for Justice
A Position Paper on Human Rights, Accountability, and Humanitarian Access in the South Kivu Highlands
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Banyamulenge, a Kinyarwanda speaking Tutsi community in the South Kivu highlands, are facing a deepening humanitarian and protection crisis, particularly in Minembwe. Independent monitoring has recorded a marked increase in air and drone strikes since late 2025 [1]. Local organizations report that schools, health centres, Minembwe hospital, churches and a community radio station have been destroyed or severely damaged. Most recently, the ISOKO school complex was reportedly struck on November 16th, 2026, destroying nine classrooms and disrupting the education of 738 pupils [12, 13]. Humanitarian organizations have had little or no access to Minembwe for more than a year, while a network of 27 Congolese humanitarian organizations reports widespread famine conditions since October 2026 [1, 13]. Hate speech challenging the community’s Congolese nationality documented for years by United Nations bodies continues to fuel hostility and place civilians at further risk [2, 3].
Community accounts and reports cited in this paper attribute attacks, restrictions on movement, and the obstruction of humanitarian assistance to the Congolese armed forces (FARDC) and allied forces. These actions have contributed to the suffering and displacement of Banyamulenge civilians. Twirwaneho, by contrast, is presented by the community as a force defending and protecting Banyamulenge civilians amid these threats. The paper calls for an end to attacks on civilian areas and essential infrastructure, immediate and unimpeded humanitarian access, independent investigation of reported incidents, accountability for violations, action against incitement, meaningful inclusion of the Banyamulenge in peace processes, and sustained international attention. The reported conditions demand urgent action to protect lives and prevent further harm.
1. Introduction
The Banyamulenge, a Kinyarwanda speaking Tutsi community of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), are enduring a serious and worsening crisis in the highlands of South Kivu, around the town of Minembwe. Since late 2025 they have lived under repeated air and drone strikes, restrictions on movement and a severe shortage of food, medicine and other essentials, in an area where humanitarian organizations have had little or no access for over a year[1]. Their Congolese nationality, long contested, is again openly denied by sections of the political class, by armed groups and by online commentators, in a climate of hostility that United Nations bodies have documented for years [2, 3].
Many Banyamulenge, and the organizations that speak for them, describe what is happening as a silent genocide: a slow destruction carried out through hatred, deprivation and indifference, largely out of the world’s sight. This paper uses the word genocide as the community uses it, as an alarm. It also relies on a principle established by the International Court of Justice: the obligation to prevent genocide arises when a State learns, or should have learned, of a serious risk, and does not wait for a verdict [6].
The paper is addressed to human rights organizations and is intended as a practical contribution to their work. It concentrates on two features of the crisis that are the most concrete and the most urgent: the recurrent drone strikes that are destroying schools, health facilities and homes, and the siege conditions in which the population is trying to survive. It sets out what independent sources have documented, what is alleged by affected communities and other parties, and what remains contested, and it concludes with recommendations.
A note on perspective. The author writes on behalf of Twirwaneho, a movement drawn from the Banyamulenge community whose conduct is itself the subject of documented concern, as section 6 records. In the interest of transparency and credibility, the paper relies wherever possible on independent sources, separates findings from allegations, and applies the same standard of accountability to every party, including the author’s own.
2. The Banyamulenge: a Congolese community
The Banyamulenge settled the high plateaux above Lake Tanganyika generations ago. Historical accounts generally place their arrival in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, well before the colonial boundaries that now separate Congo from Rwanda and Burundi were drawn. They have lived there since as herders and farmers, in the hills of Fizi, Mwenga and Uvira, and their name, taken from the Mulenge hills, is a statement of place as much as of identity.
Yet their belonging has been questioned for decades. Politicians, militia leaders and online campaigners routinely portray them as foreigners who should return to Rwanda, a claim that ignores their history and treats citizenship as a favor that neighboring communities or shifting political majorities may grant or withdraw. Nationality is a legal status protected by Congolese law and by international human rights standards, and it cannot be made conditional on the goodwill of others. The consequences of this narrative have been serious and recurrent, from the persecution of Congolese Tutsi in the late 1990s to the 2004 massacre at Gatumba, in Burundi, in which more than 150 Congolese Tutsi refugees were killed and 106 wounded [7]. They have left a lasting climate of suspicion in which any Banyamulenge may be accused of disloyalty because of how they speak or what they look like.
3. Hate speech and incitement: warning signs on record
The concern is not only the community’s own perception. In 2021 the UN Joint Human Rights Office in the DRC documented a pattern of hate speech and incitement to hostility directed at the Banyamulenge, spread through social media and public discourse by political figures, civil society actors, community leaders and others [2]. In June 2022 the then UN High Commissioner for Human Rights and the Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide expressed concern at an escalation of such speech nationwide, specifically against Kinyarwanda speaking Banyamulenge, noting that it had been spread by political party figures, community leaders, civil society actors and members of the Congolese diaspora[3].
After an official visit to the DRC in November 2022, preceded by a technical mission of her office, the Special Adviser reported that indicators from the UN Framework of Analysis for Atrocity Crimes were present in the country. They included the dissemination of hate speech without independent mechanisms to address it, the politicization of identity, the proliferation of local militias and other armed groups, and widespread and systematic attacks, including sexual violence, against the Banyamulenge in particular, on the basis of their ethnicity and perceived allegiance with neighboring countries [3]. Genocide Watch has classified the situation of the Banyamulenge as a genocide emergency since 2020[4], and in September 2025 the UN Human Rights Office warned of rising hate speech and ethnically motivated attacks in Kinshasa and the Kasai provinces against people presumed to be linked to the M23[5].
These assessments pre-date the present escalation, and they matter because of what history teaches. Mass atrocities rarely begin with killing. They begin with narratives that strip a community of legitimacy and humanity, until violence becomes easier to justify and easier to ignore.
4. Drone strikes on schools, health facilities and homes
4.1 A pattern of recurrent strikes
Human Rights Watch, analyzing data from the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project, found a significant increase in reported air and drone strikes in the South Kivu highlands since November 2025, and it received credible information on eight incidents involving drone strikes between January and March 2026[1]. Witnesses and relatives told the Organisation that drone attacks killed at least two Banyamulenge in March: an 86 year old man tending his cattle near Minembwe on March 23th, 2026 and a 14 year old boy in a field in Fizi territory on March 30th, 2026. A church at Ilundu was struck at night and a community radio station near Minembwe was damaged. “We are being bombed all the time,” a medical worker in Minembwe said [1]. A resident interviewed in June by a South Kivu civil society collective went further: the war is present every day, the drones disturb the population constantly, and people keep fleeing [14]. Independent monitors have documented repeated strikes, but a complete daily record is not publicly available, and the frequency described by residents should be established by impartial inquiry. Human Rights Watch noted that it is unclear whether the attacks it examined were intended to hit military objectives.
A consortium of Congolese human rights groups, the International Consortium for Human Rights in Congo, reported in a letter of April 23rd, 2026 to the UN Secretary General and the US Secretary of State more than a dozen air and drone strikes between August 2025 and April 2026 across the highlands, which is attributed to the Congolese army and allied groups. Localities named include Baruta, Rugezi, Kalingi, Ilundu and Gakenke, and the letter reports that tens of thousands of people were displaced within weeks [7].
4.2 Education under fire
The most recent and best documented attack on education took place on the evening of November 16th, 2026, when strikes hit Minembwe center. The ISOKO school complex, managed by the local Non-Governmental Organisation UGEAFI, lost nine classrooms and its administrative building, together with school archives, administrative records, computer equipment and furniture. The school had enrolled 738 pupils for the 2026-2027 academic year, 315 girls and 423 boys, taught by 34 teachers, and it has suspended primary and secondary classes. Founded on the initiative of parents more than twenty years ago, it admits pupils of every community and offers secondary courses in agronomy, veterinary medicine, nursing, mathematics and physics, and commerce and computing. Its operator describes it as a place of meeting and social cohesion among the region’s communities and says it is guided by neutrality and impartiality [12].
Accounts of this attack differ in important ways, and the differences should be resolved by investigators. The operator reported no deaths or injuries, since the strike came outside school hours [12]. The humanitarian alert of the Réseau Umoja, a network of 27 Congolese humanitarian and development organizations, reports that about ten civilian homes were also destroyed and that human losses were reported, without a final toll. The DRC army spokesperson publicly claimed the operation and justified it by stating that armed elements of the Front for the Refoundation of the Nation were present on school premises [13]. Even if armed elements were present, the parties would remain bound by the rules of distinction, proportionality and precaution, and the operator’s account of a neutral community school is flatly at odds with the claim of military use.
The Réseau Umoja further reports that between March and June 2026 dozens of schools in the highlands were destroyed or seriously damaged[13], and the consortium reports that explosives were dropped on the campus of Ebenezer University in Minembwe on April 22nd, 2026[7]. The report describes more than the loss of buildings: pupils who cannot return to class, teachers without a place to teach, and a generation whose schooling is being interrupted in a community already cut off from the outside world. Hunger compounds the damage, since children have reportedly been fainting in classrooms for lack of food [13].
4.3 Health care under fire
Health services in the highlands are failing from two directions at once, attacks on facilities and a shortage of supplies. Human Rights Watch reported in April that medical facilities faced dire shortages of medicine and basic necessities and that the Minembwe area had been cut off from aid for more than a year [1]. A resident told a South Kivu civil society collective in June that the Ilundu health center, next to the airfield, had also been bombed [14]. The Réseau Umoja reports that health centres and the Minembwe hospital were among the civilian infrastructure destroyed or seriously damaged between March and June 2026[13]. None of these reports can be dismissed without investigation.
The consequences extend far beyond the immediate casualties. A health center that is damaged or without medicine cannot treat injuries from drone strikes, cannot deliver babies safely and cannot manage the malnutrition now reported in the highlands. The Réseau Umoja reports generalized famine since October 2026 and dozens of deaths, mainly among older people and children under five [13]. Whether the figures prove to be accurate or not, the combination of attacks on health infrastructure, a closed supply route and widespread hunger is exactly the combination that turns ordinary illness into mortality.
Date | Facility or target | Reported effect | Source and status |
March-June 2026 | Dozens of schools, health centres, the Minembwe hospital, a community radio station, the airfield and churches | Destroyed or seriously damaged | Réseau Umoja alert no. 32 [13] verified by photos |
June 2026 | Ilundu health center, next to the airfield | Bombed; population fled | Resident testimony to a South Kivu civil society collective [14]; verified by photos |
April 22nd, 2026 | Ebenezer University campus, Minembwe | Explosives dropped | International Consortium for Human Rights in Congo [7]; not independently verified |
November 16th, 2026 | ISOKO school complex, Minembwe Centre | Nine classrooms and administrative block destroyed; about ten homes destroyed; 738 pupils out of school | Operator statement [12]; Réseau Umoja [13]; army spokesperson’s reported claim and casualty figures unverified |
4.4 Responsibility and the question of military use
Responsibility for individual strikes has not been independently established. Human Rights Watch concluded that the targets suggest the Congolese army and coalition controlled the drones involved in the incidents it examined, but said it could not establish this with certainty. It had asked the army’s regional commander for information about the strikes and had received no response when it published [1]. The Burundian army has about 4,000 troops deployed in Fizi and Mwenga territories alongside Congolese forces, according to security sources cited by the same Organisation[1], and local civil society attributes some of the 2026 strikes to Congolese and Burundian military assets[12]. Banyamulenge organizations and allied media also contend that neighboring areas hosting armed groups are spared while Banyamulenge villages are struck, a claim that an impartial inquiry could test quickly.
4.5 The legal framework
The law leaves little room for doubt. International humanitarian law prohibits attacks directed at civilians and civilian objects, indiscriminate and disproportionate attacks, and the starvation of civilians as a method of warfare. Attacks on buildings dedicated to education and on hospitals are war crimes under the Rome Statute unless the buildings are military objectives, and the Security Council has condemned attacks on schools and on medical facilities and personnel in armed conflict, in resolutions 2601 (2021) and 2286 (2016)[15]. These obligations bind every party, and they cannot be waived because the victims belong to a community suspected of sympathy with an armed group.
5. A besieged enclave: siege, famine and isolation
The United Nations classifies humanitarian access restrictions in the highlands as severe. Human Rights Watch reported in April that Minembwe has been surrounded by Congolese and allied forces since its capture in March 2025, that Congolese armed forces and armed groups were interfering with aid, that aid organizations had had little or no access for more than a year, and that staples such as sugar and salt cost about five times more than elsewhere in South Kivu [1]. The Réseau Umoja speaks of nineteen months of blockade, of fields and granaries looted or burned and herds decimated, and of drought compounding the hardship [13]. Telephone networks near Minembwe have been disrupted for more than a year, so that news of what happens reaches the outside world late and thinly [1]. In early November 2026 the AFC/M23 (now FRN) alliance and different independent media reported renewed strikes and a tightened blockade, with salt reportedly selling at about thirty US dollars a kilogram [9].
Some residents and advocates describe Minembwe as an open air concentration camp: a place from which civilians cannot leave, where they are starved, cut off from communication and bombed, while the world looks away. The comparison conveys the intensity of their fear, and the features it points to are real and documented: confinement, deprivation, isolation and the dehumanizing rhetoric of Section 3. It should nonetheless be handled with precision, because accuracy is what gives a warning its force. The Nazi extermination camps were built for the industrial killing of Jews. The more exact historical parallel is the besieged enclave, in which a population is enclosed and deprived until its survival is in danger, and the legal provision that speaks to it is the Genocide Convention’s prohibition of deliberately inflicting on a group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction. Whether intent of that kind exists can only be established by a credible, independent inquiry. That the conditions themselves already warrant one is beyond serious dispute.
The picture also has a complicating feature that honesty requires us to record. The coalition of DRC army (FARDC), Burundian armed forces (FDNB), Wazalendo militias, FDLR and P5 that restricts the movement of civilians or the passage of aid bears responsibility for what follows.
6. Humanitarian and social consequences
In the highlands, cattle are not merely property. They are the foundation of livelihood, savings and cultural life, and their loss deepens poverty and dependency. Families sleep in fear of the next strike, and residents say that when reconnaissance drones appear overhead they know they must flee [1]. Children are growing up amid displacement, bereavement, hunger and interrupted schooling, and the long-term psychosocial toll on a population that has lived with repeated violence, hatred and uncertainty is likely to be considerable and deserves assessment in its own right. When schools, clinics and livelihoods are damaged together, the consequences reach far beyond the day of the attack and undermine the means by which a community survives at all.
7. The cost of international silence
Part of what makes this emergency dangerous is how little noise it makes. Human Rights Watch itself describes the conflict as vastly underreported and warns that without more attention the situation will worsen [1]. The United Nations, the African Union and regional bodies have repeatedly affirmed the protection of civilians, yet their credibility depends on applying that principle consistently, including where the victims are a minority far from the capitals. Journalistic neglect can become diplomatic neglect. Sustained reporting and independent documentation are among the few tools available to a community with little else, and the demonstrations organized by Banyamulenge in the diaspora in the United States and Kenya in April show a people refusing to be forgotten.
8. Recommendations
8.1 Stop attacks on schools, health facilities and homes
DRC army and their coalition should cease attacks on schools, hospitals, health centres and residential areas, and should refrain from using such buildings for military purposes. Any party that claims a school or clinic was a military objective should publish the evidence on which it relied. Donors and humanitarian partners should support rapid reconstruction and temporary learning spaces, so that the 738 pupils of ISOKO and other displaced children can return to class, and should restore basic health services in Minembwe, including surgical and trauma care.
8.2 Humanitarian access, safe passage and famine response
The Congolese authorities and their allies should all facilitate humanitarian corridors into the highlands and guarantee safe passage for civilians who wish to leave. The UN and its humanitarian partners should urgently assess food security and nutrition in the highlands against recognized famine classification standards, mobilize food and nutrition assistance, and report publicly on what they find. The commitment made by the army’s regional commander to facilitate access should be put to the test through a clear timetable and independent observation [1].
8.3 Independent investigation and accountability
The UN Human Rights Office, the African Union or an independent international commission should be given access to establish who launched each reported attack, what was targeted, what casualties resulted and whether civilian objects were unlawfully hit, beginning with the strike on the ISOKO school complex on November 16th, 2026. The Congolese authorities have a duty to investigate and prosecute war crimes committed by their forces or on their territory, and the Office of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, which has jurisdiction over crimes in the DRC, should monitor developments in the highlands closely.
8.4 Monitoring and transparency about foreign forces
An independent international monitoring mechanism, under the auspices of the United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) or another impartial body, should be established or strengthened to monitor the presence, activities and conduct of foreign forces and armed actors operating in the South Kivu highlands. Such a mechanism should be mandated to document military deployments, investigate allegations of violations, monitor ceasefire compliance where applicable, and report its findings independently. States involved in deploying or supporting forces in the highlands, including Burundi, FDLR, P5 and mercenaries should disclose the nature, size, mandate and operational role of their deployments and ensure accountability for any violations of international law. The monitoring mechanism should be granted safe, unhindered and sustained access to affected areas and communities, including Minembwe, to ensure that its findings are credible, transparent and grounded in direct observation.
8.5 Countering hate speech and securing equal citizenship
The Congolese authorities should investigate and prosecute incitement to hatred and violence, whether voiced by officials, community leaders or online influencers, and should state clearly and publicly that the Banyamulenge are Congolese, with every right that follows. The prevention mechanisms already available, including the national committee for the prevention of genocide and the plan of action for religious leaders endorsed by the UN Special Adviser, should be made operational [3]. Social media platforms should enforce their own rules against incitement in the languages used.
8.6 Inclusive peace processes
The peace processes under way, including those conducted in Washington and Doha, should include representatives of the Banyamulenge and other minority communities, and any settlement should carry guarantees for minority protection, accountability for abuses by all armed actors and a credible path to truth telling and local reconciliation. The long standing dispute over local administration in Minembwe merits a political settlement, not a military one.
8.7 Sustained international attention
The UN Human Rights Council and its special procedures, the Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide, the African Union and regional bodies should keep the situation of the Banyamulenge on their agendas and request regular public reporting. Human rights organizations, journalists and faith communities can help by documenting events independently and keeping this crisis visible.
10. Conclusion
Behind every date and place named in this paper is a family: a child whose classroom is now rubble, an old man with his cattle, a nurse working without medicine, a mother searching for food. They are not asking for privilege. They are asking for what international law already promises, the right to live in safety and to belong in the country where their ancestors are buried. Whether that promise holds in the hills above Lake Tanganyika is a question about the DRC, but it is also a question about whether the world’s commitment to human dignity is real. The warnings are on record, the reports call for independent verification, and the cost of delay falls on civilians. It would be an unfortunate failure if, years from now, it had to be admitted that the signs were clear and no one acted.
22 November 2026
By Robert MUTWARANGABO
References and sources
Several sources are reports by local organizations or advocacy outlets and are identified as such in the text.
[1] Human Rights Watch, “DR Congo: Aid, Movements Hindered in South Kivu Highlands,” April 14th, 2026, including its analysis of ACLED data and the UN classification of humanitarian access constraints.
[2] UN Joint Human Rights Office in the DRC, Report on hate speech and incitement to hostility in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, March 2021.
[3] Statement by the UN Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide following her official visit to the DRC, November 10th, and 13th, 2022, which also refers to the joint statement with the then UN High Commissioner for Human Rights of 17 June 2022.
[4] Genocide Watch, classification of the situation of the Banyamulenge as a genocide emergency (2020); see also “Under the shadow of violence: are the Banyamulenge experiencing a slow genocide?” Taylor & Francis Online, 2025 (DOI 10.1080/13642987.2025.2453663).
[5] UN Human Rights Office warnings of September 2025 on hate speech and ethnically motivated attacks, as referenced in Amani Africa, “Open session on hate crimes and fighting genocide ideology in Africa,” April 8th, 2026.
[6] International Court of Justice, Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), judgment of February 26th, 2007.
[7] International Consortium for Human Rights in Congo, letter to the UN Secretary General and the US Secretary of State, April 23rd, 2026, as reported by KT Press, “Campaigners Write to Guterres, Rubio Warning of Banyamulenge Genocide in Congo,” April 28th, 2026.
[8] UN Security Council, Resolution 2808 (2025).
[9] KT Press, “Kilo of Salt Is $30 in Minembwe as DR Congo Implements Humanitarian Blockade,” November 2026.
[10]The New Times (Kigali), “Scapegoating Cannot End DR Congo Crisis, Rwandan Envoy Tells UN,” September 9th, 2026, as published by all Africa.
[11]all Africa (French edition), reports of 21 and 28 August 2026 on the downing of an AFC/M23 drone near Fizi and of an aircraft attributed to the AFC/M23–RDF coalition near Minembwe.
[12]SOS Médias Burundi, “RDC : une école détruite par des bombardements attribués aux FARDC à Minembwe, 738 élèves privés de cours,” November 17th, 2026, including the statement of UGEAFI.
[13]Réseau Umoja, Humanitarian Alert no. 32, November 17th, 2026, as reported by Pax Nobiscum (campaignforpeacedrc.com), “Minembwe: blocus humanitaire, famine et bombardements,” November 18th, 2026.
[14] all Africa (French edition), “Minembwe, au cœur d’une guerre sans fin,” June 2026, reporting testimony gathered by the South Kivu civil society collective.
[15]Additional Protocols I and II to the Geneva Conventions (1977); Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, articles 8(2)(b)(ix) and 8(2)(e)(iv); UN Security Council Resolutions 2286 (2016) and 2601 (2021).




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